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I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law is one of the strongest legal protections against
anticompetitive practices in the internal market.1 The internal market
is a single market in which there is free movement of goods, services,
and capital, where people are able to live, study, work, or conduct
business.2 The Single Market Act I and the Single Market Act II are
revitalization efforts put into the internal market.3 The Single Market
retained the principle structure of the internal market, merely adding
goals to increase market participation.4 Single Market Act I and II are
intended to improve trade and the consumer experience in the internal
1. See generally Marcus D. Williams, European Antitrust Law and Its
Application to American Corporations and Their Subsidiaries, 9 WHITTIER L. REV.
517, 518 22 (1987) (explaining the role antitrust laws play in the internal
marketplace, specifically in Europe).
2. See Publ’ns Off. of the Eur. Union, Internal Market, EUR-LEX (2020),
https://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/internal_market.html?locale=en&root_default=SU
M_1_CODED%3D24 (evolving since its creation in 1993, the internal market of the
EU developed into the Single Market).
3. See Eur. Comm’n, The European Single Market, EUROPA (2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en (exhibiting that the Single Market
describes the EU as a single territory without limitations on trade, goods, or
services); see also Eur. Comm’n, Single Market Act, EUROPA (2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/smact_en (showing that in April 2011,
the Commission presented twelve levers to grow and strengthen the market).
4. See Eur. Comm’n, The European Single Market, supra note 3 (boosting
collective participation by member states, thus increasing overall confidence in the
Single Market).
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market.5 In the European Union (EU), antitrust laws are intended to
protect and produce fair competition in the internal market.6 The
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits
anticompetitive practices and abuse of power within the market, and
the consequences for violations are costly.7
Collecting proprietary data for an unfair competitive advantage in
the market is inconsistent with the TFEU.8 Proprietary data consists of
information ranging from formulas, product manufacturing, customer
lists, and other information that is typically considered confidential.9
Proprietary data collection is a contractual requirement for sellers to
access the Amazon marketplace.10 Amazon’s proprietary data
collection has led to direct competition between Amazon and
independent third-party sellers.11 The proprietary data Amazon
collects is used to create competitive private-label products.12 Amazon
5. See id. (evidencing that each act significantly invested in the Single Market
to exploit its untapped potential).
6. See Radostina Parenti, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Competition
Policy,
EUROPA
(2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/82/competition-policy (“The
fundamental objective of EU competition rules is to ensure the proper functioning
of the internal market.”); see also Eur. Comm’n, Competition Antitrust Overview,
EUROPA
(last
updated
Nov.
21,
2014),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html
(evidencing
the
importance of competition in the EU).
7. See Parenti, supra note 6 (“The antitrust branch aims at restoring competitive
conditions, should improper behavior by companies (e.g. cartels or abuse of
dominance) cause distortions of competition.”).
8. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union arts. 101–02, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88, 89. [hereinafter TFEU].
9. See, e.g., Proprietary Information, INC. (last updated Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/proprietary-information.html
(“Proprietary
information can include secret formulas, processes, and methods used in
production.”).
10. See Dana Mattioli, Amazon Scooped Up Data from Its Own Sellers to Launch
Competing Products, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2020, 9:51 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-sellers-tolaunch-competing-products-11587650015 (explaining that companies that wish to
sell on Amazon cannot restrict Amazon’s access to their proprietary data).
11. See id. (evidencing that Amazon creates competitive private-label products
based on the best-sellers on the platform, reviewing the positives and negatives, then
offers the same product as a recommended choice for consumers).
12. See id. at 2 (exhibiting that Amazon has more than forty-five private-label
brands with over 243,000 products on the marketplace, ranging from furniture to
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manufactures private-label products using data that should be
confidential.13 After copying the best-selling third-party products on
its platform, Amazon directly advertises its own brand of the copied
product as an alternative to the third-party option, at a lower price.14
Amazon is engaging in anticompetitive practices by knowingly
offering more cost-effective versions of independent, best-selling
third-party products.15 Creating a market and creating the products
sold on that market is inconsistent with regulations against abusing the
internal market.16
This Comment argues that Amazon is violating Articles 101(1)(d)
and Article 102(c) of the TFEU by contractually requiring
independent third-party sellers to share proprietary information to
access its marketplace, and using that data to create competitive,
identical, private-label products.

clothing).
13. See id. (stating that Amazon employees themselves have noted and have
testified before the United States Congress that the inappropriate use of proprietary
data is against company policy).
14. Accord Eugene Kim, Amazon Has Been Promoting Its Own Products at the
Bottom of Competitors’ Listings, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2019, 3:48 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/02/amazon-is-testing-a-new-feature-that-promotesits-private-label-brands-inside-a-competitors-product-listing.html
(showing
Amazon is purposefully advertising its own products under third-party products as
an alternative option); see also Renee Dudley, Amazon’s New Competitive
Advantage: Putting Its Own Products First, PROPUBLICA (Jun. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/amazons-new-competitive-advantage-puttingits-own-products-first (discussing Amazon’s advertising efforts to combat against
third-party sellers).
15. See Kim, supra note 14 (concluding that Amazon receives an unfair
advertising advantage when it advertises its own products over the third-party
products); see also Dudley, supra note 14 (finding that the practice of requiring
sellers to pay for advertising slots but reserving the top slots for itself is
anticompetitive); TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (stating that applying dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage is prohibited as incompatible with the internal
market).
16. See Kim, supra note 14 (evidencing the difficulty in maintaining a
competitive market that is created by Amazon brands competing against private
brands); see also Dudley, supra note 14 (showing that Amazon sells advertising
space to create targeted advertising); TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102 ( Any abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market ).
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Part II of this comment will discuss the background of the EU,
antitrust laws in the EU, and the TFEU, specifically Articles 101 and
102.17 Additionally, this section will contribute background about the
application of the TFEU against other entities within the internal
market.18 Part III analyzes Amazon’s practice of proprietary data
collection and how those practices violate the TFEU.19 Part IV
contains recommendations for the EU to sue Amazon, as well as
recommendations for regulating business practices of the online ecommerce market to prevent Amazon and others from creating
competitive private-labels through their dominant market positions.
Added recommendations are offered in support of how to allocate
resources for collective redress against anticompetitive practices.

II. BACKGROUND
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
COMPETITION LAW
In the late 1950s, six States formed an economic association called

17. See TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101 (prohibiting agreements creating
competitive disadvantages which inherently distorts the market), 102 (prohibiting
abuse of a dominant position in the market that affects trade between Member
States).
18. See Elizabeth Schulze, If You Want to Know What a US Tech Crackdown
May Look Like, Check Out What Europe Did, CNBC (June 7, 2019, 2:01 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/07/how-google-facebook-amazon-and-applefaced-eu-tech-antitrust-rules.html (reviewing the various ways the EU cracked down
on antitrust matters against technology companies for violating positions of
dominance in the market); see also Jamie Condliffe, A Brief History of the Impact
of E.U. Antitrust Fines on Tech Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/business/dealbook/eu-antitrust-techstocks.html (showing a thorough, but brief, analysis of various penalties for antitrust
violations by tech companies in the EU).
19. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (detailing the methods used by Amazon
executives to replicate third-party products); see also TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101
(“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market . . .
apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”), 102 (“Any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market . . .
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”).
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the European Community, which consisted of three communities.20
The three communities were: (1) The European Coal and Steel
Community, organized in 1951 under the Treaty of Paris; (2) The
European Economic Community, created by the Treaty of Rome in
1957; and (3) Euratom, formulated in the second version of the Treaty
of Rome in 1957.21 The European Economic Community was a central
governing body for the enforcement of policies between Member
States.22 The European Economic Community operated through four
institutions: (1) The Commission; (2) the Council of Ministers; (3) the
Parliament (formerly the Assembly); and (4) the European Court of
Justice.23 The European Economic Community created a common
market and customs union among the members while retaining
legislative authority.24 In 1962, the newly formed Council passed
Regulation No. 17/62.25 This regulation developed the implementation
of Articles 85 and 86 from the Treaty of Rome (commonly known as
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community)
regardingcompetitive practices in the internal market.26 Articles 85
and 86 were the foundation of competition regulation prior to the
official formation of the EU.27
The Maastricht Treaty, formerly the TEU, was executed in 1993
20. See Matthew J. Gabel, European Community, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-CommunityEuropean-economic-association (stating that the original European Member States
included Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany).
21. Williams, supra note 1, at 518 (signaling that the present-day EU has adopted
a central focus on improving the Single Market).
22. See Gabel, supra note 20 (evidencing that the communities are more than a
customs union, as the foundation of the communities developed the modern EU).
23. See Williams, supra note 1, at 518 22 (showing that the Commission and
the Council retain legislative powers and all legislation proceeds to Parliament
where the legislation is accepted or rejected).
24. See Gabel, supra note 20 (showing that the Economic Community created a
common market by eliminating trade barriers and tariffs between the Member
States).
25. Council Regulation 17/62, art. 1, 1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 88 (European
Economic Community).
26. Id.
27. See id; see also Heather Campbell, Antitrust Law Encyclopaedia Britannica
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/antitrust-law (stating decisions
regarding antitrust law in Europe are based on Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome).
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and officially formed the present-day EU.28 Under the Maastricht
Treaty, the European Economic Commission was renamed the
European Community and became embedded as one of the first pillars
of the newly formed EU.29 Under this change, Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome became Articles 81 and 82 as part of a
renumbering of the Treaty of Rome (commonly known as the Treaty
Establishing the European Community)per the Treaty of Amsterdam,
executed in 2012.30 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 legislated the
implementation of the newly renamed Articles.31 The Lisbon Treaty,
the most recent treaty enacted by the EU, led to the TFEU.32 Under the
Lisbon Treaty, the TFEU replaced the European Community
(formerly the EC), and the Treaty of Rome (commonly known as the
Treaty Establishing the European Community) was renamed the
TFEU.33

B. TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION (TFEU)
i. General Background
On October 26, 2012, the TFEU replaced the Treaty of Rome and
28. See Adam Augustyn, Maastricht Treaty, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Maastricht-Treaty; see
generally Matthew J. Gabel, European Union, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan.
31, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union (explaining that prior
to the formation of the official EU, the focus of the States was the economic
association and the power of free trade between the States).
29. See Gabel, supra note 20 (explaining that the EEC became the EC but kept
the substantive value of the EEC).
30. See Council Regulation 1/2003, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC) (evidencing that
Articles 85 and 86 officially became Articles 81 and 82); see generally Heather
Campbell, Treaty of Rome, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Rome (showing that the renumbering
did not change the content of the Articles).
31. See Council Regulation 1/2003, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC) (showing how
Articles 85 and 86 officially became Articles 81 and 82 and how the implementation
in the Single Market remains the same).
32. See Michael Ray, Lisbon Treaty, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 24,
2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Lisbon-Treaty (showing that the Lisbon
Treaty, the most recent Treaty altering the foundation of the EU, led to the creation
of the TFEU).
33. See id. (explaining that the Treaty Establishing the European Community is
another name for the Treaty of Rome, which is now officially named the TFEU).
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formally dissolved the European Community.34 The TFEU is the
current binding instrument recognizing the Members and legislative
powers of the EU.35 The treaty is a modernized version of the Treaty
of Rome and includes the adoption of Articles 101 09, which regulate
competition in the internal market.36 Under the TFEU, Articles 81 and
82 of the EC Treaty became Articles 101 and 102.37 Articles 101 and
102 regulate trade involving unfair undertakings and agreements and
abuse of power in the market.38 Undertakings are agreements between
parties that involve any economic activity, including contracts,
arrangements, or understandings that affect the internal market in the
EU.39 The TFEU, under Article 3(3), establishes a market free from
distortion. 40 Distortion is a phenomenon that manipulates the market
by restricting competition and limiting consumer choice.41 The
restrictions on competition create inherently favorable outcomes for
the largest entity in the market.42 Article 3(3) is enforced under
Protocol No. 27, which gives the EU authority to take action against
34. See id. (showing that under the TFEU, the EC was no longer needed and was
dissolved).
35. See id. (including twenty-seven active Member States across Europe; The
United Kingdom, a founding Member State of the European Union, formally left in
2020).
36. See TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101 02 (evidencing that the TFEU brought
several needed updates to the antitrust laws in the EU, creating Articles 101-109 that
address competition within the EU); see also Parenti, supra note 6 (explaining that
Articles 101-09 regulate competition in the Single Market, covering a broad range
of sectors in the EU).
37. See Campbell, supra note 30 (showing that Articles 101 and 102, originally
85 and 86, have remained the same in substance over time).
38. E.g., Parenti, supra note 6 (showing that Article 101 regulates transactions
between two or more market operators, while Article 102 prohibits abuse of the
market).
39. Accord PUBL’NS OFF. OF THE EUR. UNION, COMPLIANCE MATTERS: WHAT
COMPANIES CAN DO TO BETTER RESPECT EU COMPETITION RULES 13 (2012)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT] (indicating that the EU
rules apply to all directly to the EU Member States).
40. See Parenti, supra note 6 (explaining that distortion refers to any economic
activity that affects trade between the Member States and affects consumer choice).
41. See id. (stating that improper behaviors by companies such as abuse of
dominance can cause distortions of competition).
42. See id. (asserting that the underlying policy goal of the TFEU and Articles
101 and 102 is to prevent unfair competition because this power dynamic facilitates
monopoly business practices).
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distortion of the internal market.43 The TFEU annexed Protocol No.
27 under Article 352 of the Treaty on European Union.44
ii. Article 101
Article 101 is a modernized descendant of former Article 85 and
later Article 81.45 Article 101 is a comprehensive ban on
anticompetitive agreements in the EU.46 Anticompetitive undertakings
are agreements that have an inherently unfair impact on the internal
market.47 Article 101(1)(d) states the following:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in
particular those which:
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 48

Article 101 begins by referencing undertakings, which, under the
TFEU, are any economic activities that take place within the EU.49
Article 101 regulates undertakings of concerted practices that affect

43. Accord TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101 02 ( . . . the Treaty on European
Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted. . . . ).
44. Id. (identifying that Protocol No. 27 gives the EU authority to enforce the
Articles of the TFEU to protect the Single Market).
45. See Gabel, supra note 20; see, e.g., Campbell, supra note 30 (discussing the
succession history of the TFEU).
46. See Parenti, supra note 6 (showing that Article 101 has a comprehensive
focus on agreements by undertakings or associations engaging with the Single
Market that would distort the market).
47. Accord EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13
( Article 101 prohibits agreements between companies which restrict competition,
unless they produce substantial benefits to customers and consumers. . . . ).
48. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (stating that Article 101 prohibits
anticompetitive practices when the practices create dissimilar conditions that distort
the market).
49. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13
( EU competition rules apply to undertakings’, a term which encompasses any
entity engaged in an economic activity. ).
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the internal market, regardless of intentionality.50 Concerted practices
include contractual arrangements made by market entities.51 If a
practice distorts, prevents, or restricts competition by applying
dissimilar conditions between equal transactions, the practice is
prohibited for being inconsistent with the purpose of Article 101.52
Dissimilar conditions are any acts by an undertaking that create
unfair competitive advantages for one entity over its competitors in
the internal market.53 Dissimilar conditions can occur by contractual
agreement with other entities, with different terms for each entity.54 If
an undertaking is in violation of 101(1), then pursuant to 101(2) the
agreement or arrangements in violation of Article 101(1) are
prohibited.55
Article 101(1) can be excused if the benefits of the practice serve
the greater good of the market by technological advancements or other
benefits to society, regardless of potential consumer harm.56 However,
50. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (showing that a small exception to Article
101(1) is carved out by Article 101(3) but otherwise the agreement is, on its face,
invalid).
51. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13
(undertakings involve any economic activity in the EU, including contractual
arrangements because those agreements affect trade in the EU).
52. See id. (exhibiting that unfair contractual arrangements are prohibited under
Article 101 regardless of the parties’ consent to the arrangement).
53. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (showing that dissimilar conditions are
created by an unfair competitive advantage between similar market operators); see
also EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13
(evidencing that dissimilar conditions are needed for both Article 101 and Article
102 violations, meaning one must unfairly benefit from the conditions stifling
competition).
54. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13 14
(showing that dissimilar conditions are about the imbalance between competitive
entities on the market by the application of unfair contractual terms).
55. PUBL’NS OFF. OF THE EUR. UNION, COMMISSION REPORT ON EU
COMPETITION LAW: RULES APPLICABLE TO ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, VOL. 1:
GENERAL
RULES
10
(2013),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/handbook_vol_1_en.pdf
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT ON EU COMPETITION LAW] ( Any agreements or
decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. ).
56. Id. ( The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of: any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings . . . ,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
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if the entity is claiming an Article 101(3) exemption, the entity bears
the burden of proving there is a societal and economic benefit to the
concerted practice or agreement that outweighs the harm to the
internal market.57
iii. Examples of Article 101’s Application
Article 101 and its predecessors have guided the EU in the effort to
effectively ban anticompetitive agreements and practices.58 T-Mobile
CZ and O2CZ are examples of companies that recently engaged in
prohibited agreements between undertakings that create dissimilar
conditions between equal transactions.59 T-Mobile CZ and O2CZ are
the two largest service providers in the Czech Republic, and they
engaged in a network sharing arrangement that created unfair
competition for the other service providers and slowed down services
for customers.60 O2CZ has over six million fixed and mobile lines, and
together the two companies control over two-thirds of the market.61
O2CZ and T-Mobile CZ entered into a network sharing contract,
meaning the two companies would share network tower service, which
was supposed to allow their consumers greater cell service.62
the resulting benefit. . . . ).
57. See id. (explaining that the burden first lies with the Commission or
complaining party to prove an Article 101(1) violation, after which the accused can
claim an Article 101(3) exception; however, the entity must prove it falls within the
exception requirements).
58. See Parenti, supra note 6 (showing that the EU has taken up cases against
several different entities for arrangements and practices that violate Article 101(1)).
59. See European Commission Press Release IP/16/3539, Antitrust:
Commission Opens Formal Investigation Into Mobile Telephone Network Sharing
in Czech Republic (Oct. 25, 2016) (explaining that T-Mobile and O2CZ, by
arrangement, forcibly excluded the only other phone service provider in the area,
creating dissimilar conditions in an otherwise equal phone service market).
60. See id. (sharing service towers, the companies slowed down outside
providers, harming customers in the Czech Republic, and creating unfair conditions
between the providers).
61. See id. (explaining that O2CZ and T-Mobile are the largest mobile and fixedline service providers in the area, but they are not the only service providers in the
area).
62. E.g., European Commission Press Release IP/19/5110, Antitrust:
Commission sends Statement of Objections to O2CZ, CETIN and T-Mobile CZ for
their network sharing agreement (Aug. 7, 2019) ( The Commission, therefore, has
reached the preliminary conclusion that the network sharing agreement between the
two main mobile operators in Czechia restricts competition and thereby harms
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However, there is a third provider in the region, Vodafone, which
is significantly smaller than the two major companies in the region.63
Vodafone was left out of the agreement and as a result, was unable to
compete.64 Furthermore, the network sharing agreement left no room
for new potential service providers in the region, disincentivizing
innovation and competitive advancement for consumers.65 As a result,
the EU opened a formal investigation regarding the network sharing
arrangement and raised formal objections to the agreement.66 The
Commissioner of Competition found that the network sharing
agreement applied dissimilar conditions by excluding the only other
competitor in the region from the agreement, which impacted
consumer choice and affected trade within an EU Member State.67
Another example of an Article 101(1) violation of the TFEU is the
Disney pay-TV program.68 By introducing a new television
subscription service, Disney raised concerns for the European
Commission by contractually limiting the geographic scope of thirdparty streaming platforms across distinct parts of the EU.69 The clauses
of the bilateral agreement between Walt Disney and Sky UK
innovation in breach of EU antitrust rules. ).
63. European Commission Press Release IP/16/3539, supra note 59 ( Vodafone
is smaller and, unlike the network sharing parties, has no meaningful presence in the
fixed telecoms segment. ).
64. See id. (explaining that forcing Vodafone to compete against two-thirds of
the market would virtually eliminate it from the market, except for two small
regions).
65. See European Commission Press Release IP/19/5110, supra note 62
(showing that Vodafone was left out of the network sharing agreement; it is unlikely
new competitors could arise when an existing competitor is excluded from the
market).
66. Id. ( The European Commission has informed Czech operators . . . of its
preliminary view that their network sharing agreement restricts competition in
breach of EU antitrust rules. ).
67. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101; see also European Commission Press Release
IP/19/5110, supra note 62 (showing that because consumers had no alternative to
O2CZ and T-Mobile CZ the Single Market was affected).
68. See European Commission Press Release IP/18/6346, Antitrust:
Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Disney in its pay-TV
investigation (Nov. 9, 2018) (explaining that Disney’s pay-TV program arranged
different channel options and services for consumers based on whether the consumer
is in the UK or an EU State).
69. See id. ( The European Commission is inviting comments from interested
parties on commitments offered by Disney to address competition concerns. . . . ).

2021]

MONOPOLY AS VAST AS THE AMAZON

579

prevented EU consumers outside of the UK and Ireland from
accessing the pay-TV services available to EU consumers in the UK
and Ireland.70 The Commission began an investigation into Disney’s
agreements to determine whether restricting broadcasters’ ability to
accept unsolicited requests from consumers violates Article 101 of the
TFEU.71
Disney and the European Commission engaged in a State of Play
meeting where the Commission brought its concerns to Disney.72 After
this meeting, Disney had a choice on whether to make concessions and
promises that would resolve the concerns of the Commission or
prepare to fight the Commission’s findings in court.73 Disney chose to
settle with the Commission and made commitments that, if unfulfilled,
the Commission can fine and sue Disney for violating Article 101 of
the TFEU.74
iv. Article 102
Article 102, like Article 101, is a descendant of earlier competition
law; specifically, Article 86 and later Article 82.75 Article 102 codifies
a comprehensive ban on abuse of the internal market, prohibiting
anticompetitive practices from a power position within the market.76
Abuse of a dominant position in the market is a form of market or
market-participant influencing to gain an anticompetitive advantage.77
Article 102(c) states the following:
70. Id. (“These clauses appear to prevent Sky UK from allowing EU consumers
outside the UK and Ireland to access pay-TV services available in the UK and
Ireland.”).
71. See id. (showing that the clauses would eliminate cross-border competition
between pay-TV broadcasters outside the licensed territory (commonly known as
“passive sales”)).
72. Id. (“Disney has decided to offer commitments to address the Commission’s
competition concerns.”).
73. See id. (illustrating that Disney chose to offer legally binding commitments
if Disney does not comply with the terms).
74. See id. (showing that the Commission ensured the commitments apply for
five years and cover standard pay-TV services and licenses).
75. See Campbell, supra note 30.
76. See Parenti, supra note 6 (stating how dominance of a company in a specific
market can harm both consumers and competitors).
77. See id. (using dominance to create dissimilar conditions between equal
transactions that distort the market).
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Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 78

Article 102 focuses on the abuse of power by market players that
disproportionally places a competitive disadvantage on other market
players.79 If other players cannot compete because a company is
abusing its power, that is inconsistent with the purpose of Article
102.80
v. Example of Article 102’s Application
Abuse of power in the internal market has taken several forms over
the years.81 Similar to Article 101 and its predecessors, Article 102 has
been applied prior to the adoption of the TFEU as Articles 86 and 82.82
Consistent with the enforcement of Article 102, the EU pursued the
violations by several tech giants.83 One of those giants is Google,
which, at the time, created contracts with mobile phone producers and
service providers, requiring multiple Google apps to be pre-installed
on devices prior to receiving the licensing for Android software.84 In
2018, Google received its third fine from the EU for abusing its
78. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102.
79. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13; see
also Parenti, supra note 6 (“A dominant position is a position of economic strength
enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained in the relevant market. . . .”).
80. See Parenti, supra note 6 (stating the purpose of the antitrust branch).
81. See Condliffe, supra note 18 (listing violations by tech companies, including
Microsoft, Google, Intel, and Facebook, for abuse of dominance in the market).
82. See Parenti, supra note 6.
83. See Condliffe, supra note 18 (exemplifying that the EU Commission
launched several investigations into several tech giants for abusing dominance
within the market).
84. See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust:
Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android
Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine (July 18,
2018) (showing that Google, the owner of Android, would not license Android
software without an agreement to download other Google applications).
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dominance in the market.85 Google used its dominance in the market
to impose illegal restrictions on Android software purchasers.86
Google required manufacturers to pre-install Google Chrome and the
Google Search App to access the Google Play Store.87 Google also
made payments to large manufacturers in exchange for pre-installing
Google apps onto their devices.88 Additionally, Google prevented
companies from selling any smartphone with a non-pre-approved
alternative version of the Android program (commonly known as an
Android fork).89 Google used its power in the market to apply
favorable conditions to Android software for Google’s benefit.90
Meanwhile, other competitors and alternatives to Android were
hindered by Google’s continued efforts to prevent competition against
the Android program and Google itself.91 Google applied dissimilar
conditions between itself and competitors, as well as between itself
and manufacturers that resulted in an unfair competitive advantage for
Google.92
In 2017, the EU fined Google 2.42 billion euros for breaching
Article 102 by abusing its dominance in the marketplace to favor its

85. See Adam Satariario & Jack Nicas, E.U. Fines Google 5.1 Billion in Android
Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018) (evidencing how Google received a
record-breaking fine for abusing its dominance in the Single Market).
86. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, supra note 84 (“Since
2011, Google has imposed illegal restrictions on Android device manufacturers and
mobile network operators to cement its dominant position in general internet
search.”).
87. Id. (“Google . . . has required manufacturers to pre-install the Google Search
app and browser app (Chrome), as a condition for licensing Google’s app store (the
Play Store). . . .”).
88. See id. (explaining that Google made significant payments to large
manufacturers in exchange for exclusive downloading of Google and Chrome
applications).
89. See id. (showing that Google would not let manufacturers sell a single device
without pre-approval, which never happened if the manufacturer refused to install
the applications).
90. See id. (explaining how Google received numerous monetary benefits and
solidified its dominance in the market).
91. See id. (highlighting that as the market in the twenty-first century was
moving away from PC desktops to mobile internet, Google strategized to maintain
dominance in the market).
92. Id. (“Today, about 80% of smart mobile devices in Europe, and worldwide,
run on Android.”).
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own shopping network.93 Google created an online comparisonshopping service within the Google search platform.94 Comparison
shopping networks require heavy traffic to be successful, and Google
began using its main search engine to give itself a competitive
advantage in the market.95 Google also used its dominance to promote
its shopping service listings while demoting competitors’ listings.96
This practice was found to have violated Article 102 of the TFEU, and
the EU ordered Google to pay the fine and cease the practice
altogether.97
In 2008, Microsoft, received the largest, at the time, fine of 1.3
billion euros from the EU for not following a 2004 judgment that
outlined the ways Microsoft abused its dominance in the market. 98
Microsoft made it extremely difficult for competitive internet
browsers to be used as alternatives to Internet Explorer in the
Windows operating system.99 Microsoft received an additional fine
from the Commission in 2009 for failing to make the appropriate
adjustments to allow fair competition between internet browsers.100
Intel faced a fine from the EU of 1.06 billion euros for supplying
rebates to major technology and computer companies that exclusively

93. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1785, Antitrust: Commission
fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as a search engine by giving an
illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service (June 27, 2017) (outlining
how Google abused its position to give its shopping network an advantage).
94. Id. (“In 2004 Google entered the separate market of comparison shopping in
Europe, with a product that was initially called ‘Froogle’, re-named ‘Google Product
Search’ in 2008 and since 2013 has been called ‘Google Shopping.’”).
95. See id. (explaining that traffic is how companies are competitive and how
more traffic leads to more clicks, generates revenue, and attracts more retailers that
want to list their products with a comparison-shopping service.)
96. See id. (revealing that investigations and evidence gathered showed the
competitors’ listings do not appear until about the fourth page of the search).
97. See id. (delineating the consequences of the Commission’s decision).
98. Stephen Castle & David Jolly, Europe Fines Microsoft $1.3 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008) (“European antitrust regulators on Wednesday fined
Microsoft $1.3 billion for failing to comply with a 2004 judgment that the company
had abused its market dominance.”).
99. See id. (stating that the Commission ordered Microsoft to disclose
information that would allow rival vendors to interoperate with Windows).
100. See id. (reporting that Microsoft was again fined in 2008, making Microsoft
the first company fined twice for the same violation in the EU’s fifty-year history).
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or almost exclusively bought Intel computer chips.101 Intel abused its
dominance in the market by supplying unfair rebate offers that
eventually led to Intel controlling seventy percent of the market. 102
When Intel controlled the market, it was worth 22 billion euros
annually.103
Facebook, after acquiring WhatsApp in 2014, merged the data
between Facebook users and WhatsApp users.104 However, prior to the
acquisition, Facebook testified that it would not merge the data
between the two applications.105 This merger created an unfair
competitive benefit for Facebook because it gained an advertising
advantage by combining user data.106 Since other apps cannot gain the
same advantage, this creates dissimilar conditions, giving Facebook a
competitive advantage inconsistent with Article 102.107

C. INTRODUCTION TO AMA ON’S BUSINESS PRACTICES
Amazon is an online marketplace created in 1994 by founder Jeff
Bezos.108 Bezos began by selling books online, then expanded the
platform over time.109 Amazon introduced music and video on the
101. James Kanter, Europe Fines Intel $1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 2009) (reporting that Intel received a fine of 1.06 billion euros for
abusing its dominance in the computer chip market).
102. See id. (explaining that the rebate chip program helped Intel maintain at least
seventy percent of the chip sales market from October 2002 to December 2007).
103. See id. (noting that sales in Europe represent about one third of the twentytwo billion euros in annual sales of computer chips by Intel).
104. Condliffe, supra note 18 (describing how the Commission fined Facebook
$122 million in the spring of 2017 for giving misleading statements about how
WhatsApp’s data would be handled during the acquisition of WhatsApp).
105. Id. ( The social network said it would not combine its data with that of
WhatsApp, but it did so later. . . . ).
106. See id. (explaining the concern was related to Facebook acquiring an unfair
advertising advantage by combining the data between the two applications).
107. See id. at 2 (suggesting that Facebook has sole access to the WhatsApp data);
TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102(c) (providing that a form of abuse of a dominant
position in a market is applying dissimilar conditions between a party and a trading
party that places the trading party at a competitive disadvantage).
108. Mark Hall, Amazon.com, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Amazoncom (tracing Amazon.com’s history).
109. See id. (describing how Amazon developed private-label products, recently
launching a business-to-business private-label brand, including a wireless internet
service).
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platform in 1998,110 and by 1999, the platform sold electronics, games,
software, home improvement items, toys, and more.111 Since its
creation, Amazon has considered itself as much more than a mere
online marketplace.112 Amazon does not consider itself a consumer
retailer but rather a technology company that simplifies online
transactions for customers.113 Amazon is still a major provider for
consumer online retail sales but has expanded to include cloud
computing services and other web-based services.114
Amazon has sixteen marketplaces across the world and has
consumers in over 180 countries, with over 175 fulfillment centers
around the world.115 According to Amazon, the company owns 288
million square feet of warehouses, offices, retail spaces, and data
centers, most of which are used for logistics for order fulfillment. 116
With over 150 million paid Prime members, and hundreds of millions
of active accounts all over the world, Amazon is a massive global
platform for sellers.117 In Europe, Amazon’s marketplaces sell across
28 countries, reaching tens of millions of customers.118 Amazon is the
110. See id. (specifying that music and videos are the first expansions that
Amazon made outside of an online bookstore).
111. Id. (“By 1999, the platform sold electronics, games, software, home
improvement items, toys, and more.”).
112. See id. (“While Amazon.com famously started as a bookseller, Bezos
contended from its start that the site was not merely a retailer of consumer
products.”).
113. See id. (“[Bezos] argued that Amazon.com was a technology company
whose business was simplifying online transactions for consumers.”).
114. See id. (“[Amazon’s] Web services business includes renting data storage
and computing resources, so-called ‘cloud computing,’ over the Internet.”).
115. Id.
116. See Alexis C. Madrigal, When Amazon Went From Big to Unbelievably Big,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/when-amazon-wentfrom-big-to-unbelievably-big/582097/ (comparing Amazon’s acquisition of
warehouse space to the space of Walmart, a box chain retailer).
117. Ben Fox Rubin, Amazon Now has Over 150 Million Paid Prime Members
Worldwide, CNET (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-now-hasover-150-million-paid-prime-members-worldwide/; Why Expand to Europe?,
AMAZON, https://sell.amazon.com/global-selling/europe.html (last visited Jan. 3,
2021) (pitching why sellers should expand into Europe using Amazon’s fulfillment
program for sellers).
118. Id. (“Amazon’s European marketplaces help you sell across 28 countries.
Don’t miss out on tens of millions of new customers.”).
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number one e-commerce market in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and
the UK, with over 290 million different visitors each month. 119
Amazon has created a global marketplace for sellers and consumers.120
Amazon is nontraditional in first creating a market, and then
creating private-label products to sell on that market.121 Rather than
working in exclusivity, Amazon began as a marketplace of inclusivity,
meaning any seller of a product could come to Amazon to sell.122
However, this allowed Amazon to create similar versions of products
and make them more affordable with better margins.123 Amazon
ultimately created conditions where independent sellers could no
longer contend against private-label competition.124 While not acting
in a blatantly exclusionary manner, such as contracting to prevent
generic brands from introducing competitive medication alternatives
on the market altogether,125 Amazon is still engaging in a similarly
anticompetitive practice, thereby hindering the internal market.126
Amazon contracts with third-party independent sellers through its
retailer platform to give them a consumer base and a means to interact
with customers online.127 Amazon also contracts to allow these sellers
119. See id. (illustrating that Amazon is the number one e-commerce market in
France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the UK, with over 290 million different visitors
each month).
120. Amazon
Stores
Around
the
World,
AMAZON,
https://sell.amazon.com/grow.html?ref_=sdus_soa_sell_grow (last visited Jan. 3,
2021) (providing data on Amazon’s global services).
121. See Hall, supra note 108 (outlining how Amazon created a market for ereaders); see also Mattioli, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that Amazon has expanded
its product line with over 243,000 products and over 43 private-label brands).
122. See Hall, supra note 108 (explaining that when Amazon introduced its first
publishing line, it allowed individuals to publish their own e-books).
123. See Kim, supra note 14 (illustrating how Amazon advertises its own privatelabel products at the bottom of competitors’ listings).
124. See id. (revealing that merchants have expressed their frustration with
Amazon’s practice).
125. European Commission Press Release IP/20/529, Mergers: Commission
Opens In-Depth Investigation into Proposed Acquisition of Tachosil by Johnson &
Johnson (Mar. 25, 2020) (reporting that Johnson & Johnson proposed the acquisition
of a smaller company, Tachosil, in an effort to prevent competition of dual
hemostatic patches in the EU market).
126. See Kim, supra note 14 (concluding that Amazon eliminates competitors in
the market by creating a market, then offering lower-cost products).
127. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 6 7 (describing one third-party independent
seller’s experience selling on Amazon.com and how Amazon’s marketplace
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to market to customers directly on its website.128 However, there is a
cost for access to Amazon and its platform.129 Amazon contracts with
these independent sellers for proprietary data collection,130 which has
led to unfair competition from Amazon.131 Collecting proprietary data,
including the materials of the product, reviews on shortcomings and
successes, marketing strategy, and other sensitive information, is not
necessary for Amazon to allow sellers onto its marketplace. 132
Nonetheless, Amazon has made it a requirement before granting
sellers access while still earning a portion of the proceeds.133
In 2007, Amazon began launching its own products, beginning with
the Kindle e-reader.134 Since then, Amazon has expanded its privatelabel to over forty-five brands with over 243,000 products on the
marketplace.135 These private label products make Amazon directly
compete with its third-party sellers, including by way of advertisement
under independent third-party seller product listings.136 Amazon
advertises directly under the third-party sellers’ product page by
offering Amazon’s private brand as a similar alternative.137
business model initially generated sales).
128. Id.; see also Kim, supra note 14 (noting that sellers can contract and pay for
the right to advertise on product listings).
129. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that brands pay between ten and
thirty percent of sales for a sponsored slot).
130. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 4 (detailing the extent of Amazon’s efforts to
acquire proprietary data from individual sellers on its website).
131. See id. at 3 (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission is investigating
Amazon on antitrust matters stemming from Amazon potentially unfairly using its
size and platform against competitors and other sellers on its site).
132. See
Let’s
Talk
Numbers,
AMAZON,
https://sell.amazon.com/pricing.html?ref_=sdus_soa_hp_pricing (last visited Jan. 3,
2021) (demonstrating that just the collection of fees and charges are sufficient for
sellers to enter the marketplace).
133. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 6 (discussing how a brand did not want to
work with Amazon because they did not want to risk private-label copying of their
product).
134. Hall, supra note 108.
135. Mattioli, supra note 10, at 2.
136. See Kim, supra note 14, at 2 (showing that at the bottom of listings, Amazon
includes a link that takes the consumer to Amazon’s private-label product); see also
Dudley, supra note 14, at 4 (highlighting the effects of Amazon’s private-label
strategy).
137. See Kim, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that at the bottom of listings,
Amazon includes a link called “Similar Item from Our Brands”).
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Furthermore, Amazon advertises its own products in the coveted top
left spot of the page where Amazon lists the products searched by
consumers.138 Being a rather new retail space has essentially enabled
Amazon to create a market and sell on it, too.139 Amazon’s conduct of
collecting proprietary data and using it to gain a competitive advantage
is inconsistent with TFEU Articles 101 and 102, prohibiting
anticompetitive practices in the EU.140

III.

ANALYSIS

After the adoption of the TFEU, the EU attempted to modernize
antitrust laws with the intent of adapting to changes in the world and
the market.141 The purpose of the TFEU and Articles 101 and 102 is to
promote competition in the market and prevent distortion of the
market.142 Amazon is in violation of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU,
and through Protocol No. 27 the EU has authority to remedy these
violations.143 Proprietary data collection is an unnecessary practice and
is the root cause of Amazon’s violations.144 Amazon is specifically in
violation of Articles 101(1)(d) and 102(c).145
Amazon engages in distortion of the market by contractually
requiring individual third-party sellers to allow proprietary data
collection,146 then using the collected data to create competitive
138. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing how Amazon’s brands are listed
higher than third-party products).
139. See Hall, supra note 108, at 4–5 (detailing the rise of Amazon’s e-reader
market).
140. TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101–02 (providing that agreements which distort
the market and abuse power in the market are prohibited).
141. See id. arts. 101–09 (demonstrating how the Treaty establishing the
European Community was subsumed under the TFEU).
142. See Parenti, supra note 6, at 1–2 (outlining the competition policy and
purpose of the TFEU).
143. Id.; see TFEU, supra note 8, Protocol No. 27 (providing that the EU has
explicit authority to remedy anticompetitive practices that affect the single market).
144. See generally Mattioli, supra note 10, at 2, 3 (detailing some of Amazon’s
proprietary data collection methods).
145. See TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101–02 (prohibiting any agreements or abuse
of dominance resulting in dissimilar conditions that affect trade, consumer choice,
or create unfair competition in the market).
146. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 1–2 (stating that Amazon admits to collecting
proprietary data from third-party sellers).

588

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

private-label products.147 After creating the private-label products,
Amazon advertises the replicated products at the bottom of the original
sellers’ product listing.148 In addition to advertising under the
independent third-party seller’s listing, Amazon also advertises its
products first in the coveted top-left corner of its webpage, pushing
independent sellers’ products lower on the page.149 Independent thirdparty sellers are directly competing with Amazon’s private-label
products, and Amazon has an unfair advantage by advertising for free
while independent sellers pay Amazon for marketing in addition to
already giving up a percentage of product proceeds.150

A. AMAZON IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 101(1)(D)
Article 101(1) prohibits concerted practices that may affect trade
between Member States which have the effect of preventing,
restricting, or distorting competition.151 Article 101(1)(d) specifically
deals with undertakings that apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, creating a competitive
disadvantage.152
Undertakings, under the European Commission definition,
encompass any entity engaged in economic activity within the EU.153
Amazon is engaged in economic activity in the EU as Amazon has
several factories in several member states, including Spain, France,
and Germany.154 Amazon has fulfillment centers and roughly six
147. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 2, 5 (detailing the extent of Amazon’s privatelabel business).
148. Kim, supra note 14, at 2.
149. Dudley, supra note 14, at 1 (“But in late March, Boyce noticed that
Amazon’s own brand, Solimo, had taken over the top left, while his client’s product
had been bumped to a lower row.”).
150. Id. at 2 (“Now, they still bid for top-row placements, but the best spot—the
top left on the first page—is unavailable across dozens of product search
terms. . . .”).
151. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101(1); see also Parenti, supra note 6, at 1 (stating
the effects of the TFEU).
152. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101(1)(d).
153. EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13.
154. Why Expand to Europe?, supra note 117, at 2, 3; see also Madrigal, supra
note 116, at 1 (“ . . . Amazon now has 288 million square feet of warehouses, offices,
retail stores, and
data centers.”).
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marketplaces in Europe.155 Amazon is also an online retailer in a
number of Member States, which constitutes economic activity in the
EU.156 The Member States are affected as the internal market allows
free trade across the EU Member States.157 Amazon is the world’s
largest online marketplace,158 and its sales comprise roughly forty
percent of EU retail sales.159
As such a large contributor to the market, Amazon can easily distort
the market by replicating independent best-selling products and selling
them at a lower price.160 Amazon stated its intention was to simplify
consumer transactions, but that does not require creating private-label
products to sell competitively.161
Creating private-label products creates dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other, independent sellers, placing the

155. Why Expand to Europe?, supra note 117, at 2, 3.
156. See Philipp Westerhoff, The German Amazon Marketplace Agreement Case:
A Landmark Settlement with Global Reach or More Hype Than Substance?,
HAUSFELD (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.hausfeld.com/news-press/the-germanamazon-marketplace-agreement-case-a-landmark-settlement-with-global-reach-ormore-hype-than-substance?lang_id=1 (explaining that Germany is the second
largest retail market for Amazon outside of the United States with net sales of almost
20 billion dollars in 2018).
157. See Gabel, supra note 20, at 1, 2 (discussing how the Single Market allows
consumers to engage with different sellers across different Member States of the
EU).
158. See Lauren Debter, Amazon Surpasses Walmart as World’s Largest Retailer,
FORBES
(May
15,
2019,
5:50
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurendebter/2019/05/15/worlds-largest-retailers2019-amazon-walmart-alibaba/?sh=605741f4171c (stating in 2019, Amazon
officially surpassed Walmart as the world’s largest retailer); see also Daniela
Coppola, Total revenue of Amazon Europe from 2011 to 2019, STATISTA (Nov. 26,
2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/934963/revenue-of-amazon-europe/
(showing how the EU market comprised a significant portion of Amazon’s global
earnings).
159. Coppola, supra note 158, at 1 (“Amazon’s European division is
headquartered and registered in Luxembourg, since June 8, 2004, with registered
branches in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.”).
160. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 10, at 5 (“Former executives said they were
told frequently by management that Amazon brands should make up more than 10%
of retail sales by 2022.”).
161. Hall, supra note 108, at 2 (invoking Jeff Bezos’s argument that Amazon was
not merely a retailer but a technology company that simplified online transactions
for consumers).
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independent sellers at a competitive disadvantage.162 Dissimilar
conditions occur in two ways – first, independent sellers incur several
costs that Amazon does not, creating a dissimilar condition.163 Second,
because Amazon uses the data to create a better version of the product,
it creates a dissimilar condition with sellers who cannot compete with
Amazon’s margins and resources, similar to the anticompetitive
practices of O2CZ and T-Mobile CZ.164 O2CZ and T-Mobile entered
into a networking sharing agreement allowing free use of cell towers
between O2CZ and T-Mobile CZ.165 However, this presented a
disadvantage for the smallest phone service provider in the region and
created a dissimilar condition because O2CZ and T-Mobile CZ had
access to a benefit that the smaller company did not.166 Furthermore,
the condition was dissimilar because the network sharing stifled
competition between the phone service providers discouraging
innovation and slowing the services provided.167
Like the mobile providers in the Czech Republic, Amazon enters
into agreements that, at face value, seem beneficial but create an unfair
competitive advantage for Amazon while harming competitors.168
Similar to the phone service providers, Amazon has a large presence
in the European market without the resource limitations of
independent third-party sellers.169 Similar to network sharing,
162. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 10, at 6 (statement of Etailz CEO Kunal
Chopra) (“‘We had a brand say they wanted to sell exclusively on Walmart, and
when we proposed Amazon, they said they don’t want to risk private-label copying
their product. . . .’”); see also TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (providing that dissimilar
conditions place trading parties at a competitive disadvantage).
163. Dudley, supra note 14, at 4 (“Amazon has an advantage over competitors
because it doesn’t have to pay itself for the best placement . . . Brands pay between
10% and 30% of sales for a sponsored slot. . . .”).
164. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 1, 4, 5 (detailing how Amazon uses data from
sellers in strategy to promote private-label products); see also European
Commission Press Release IP/19/5110, supra note 62, at 1 (reporting the
Commission’s finding that the agreement between O2CZ and T-Mobile CZ gave the
parties a competitive advantage over other phone service providers).
165. European Commission Press Release IP/19/5110, supra note 62, at 1.
166. See id. (explaining how the two larger companies cover all mobile
technologies, servicing 85% of the population, while Vodafone does not).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 10, at 5–7 (detailing one seller’s experience).
169. See Westerhoff, supra note 156, at 4 (stating that Germany, has over 300,000
merchants on the platform and accounts for 55-60 percent of Amazon’s overall
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proprietary data collection creates an unfair advantage for Amazon.170
The CZ mobile companies applied dissimilar conditions to
competitors in the market by engaging in network sharing and gave
them an unfair competitive advantage over the smaller company.171
Like the CZ mobile companies, Amazon applies dissimilar conditions
to the sellers by requiring proprietary data collection from them,
giving Amazon an unfair advantage.172
The dissimilar condition of cost-effectiveness exists between what
an independent seller must charge for a product and what Amazon
needs to charge for a product.173 Amazon can afford greater overhead
costs and has significant access to resources.174 Amazon can produce
private-label items and earn all of the profit without cost, unlike the
independent sellers.175 By making the replicated products cheaper,
Amazon is inherently driving business away from smaller independent
business owners who cannot lower the cost of their product, especially
in cases where it is the only product the seller has.176 Independent bestsellers end up losing to Amazon’s replicated, improved product.177
Amazon owns a massive amount of physical space to mass-produce
replicated products; this gives Amazon another advantage over

sales); Coppola, supra note 158, at 1 (stating that in 2019, Amazon grossed
approximately 32 million euros in revenue from the EU market).
170. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 5, 6 (noting that Amazon collects proprietary
sales data and that more than 1,000 Amazon Marketplace sellers have said Amazon
sells private-labeled products that directly compete with their products).
171. See European Commission Press Release IP/19/5110, supra note 62, at 1
(finding that practices provided a benefit to the consumers using O2CZ and TMobile CZ that Vodofone customers did not have).
172. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 5 (reporting that Amazon has a goal of
controlling at least ten percent of the retail market by 2022).
173. See generally Let’s Talk Numbers, supra note 132, at 1, 5–12 (listing all the
fees independent sellers must incur to sell products on Amazon.com).
174. See Madrigal, supra note 116, 1, 2 (outlining the explosive growth of
Amazon’s warehouses, officers, retail stores, and data centers in recent years).
175. See Let’s Talk Numbers, supra note 132, at 1, 5–12 (listing all the fees
independent sellers must incur to sell products on Amazon.com).
176. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining how one seller’s product was
pushed out of the top spot by Amazon’s competing product).
177. Kim, supra note 14, at 3 (“If you’ve got Amazon brands competing against
you, it’s just become that much more difficult to be competitive in the
marketplace. . . .”).
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independent sellers by lowering overhead costs.178 Furthermore,
Amazon gathers proprietary data after the product has been created
and entered into the market.179 Again, this gives Amazon an advantage
through access to data about what to fix about the product and what
works even before the seller has a chance to edit or revise the
product.180
Amazon owns the marketplace and therefore does not pay to market
its own products.181 Instead, Amazon markets its products and thirdparty seller products entirely at its discretion.182 Independent sellers,
however, pay to market their products in addition to other fees for
selling on Amazon.183
Disney, similar to Amazon, created agreements with third-party
entities that created unfair competition between third-party platforms
and consumer location.184 Disney restricted competition based on the
location of EU consumers.185 Streaming services should be equal
178. Madrigal, supra note 116, at 1, 2 ( Amazon now has 288 million square feet
of warehouses, officers, retail stores, and data centers. ).
179. See Mattioli, supra note 10, at 1 4 (explaining how Amazon begins
collecting a seller’s proprietary data from the moment the item enters the
marketplace, and the information is easily accessible to executives at Amazon).
180. See id. at 6 9 (detailing how one independent seller noticed that Amazon had
a competing product within six months of the initial launch of the product).
181. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 3 ( During the [COVID-19] pandemic,
Amazon has begun to use that position for its own private-label products, without
bidding, under the heading featured from our brands.’ ); see also Kim, supra note
14, at 1 (reporting that sellers complain of seeing Similar Items From Our Brands
as an alternative link at the bottom of the product page they are paying to sell their
products on).
182. See Dudley, supra note 14 ( By putting its own private brands in some of
the most valuable slots, Amazon is sacrificing short-term ad revenue to build up
sales of its private brands over time, consultants said. ); see also Mattioli, supra note
10; Kim, supra note 14.
183. Let’s Talk Numbers, supra note 132; Dudley, supra note 14 (evidencing that
sellers agree to give a part of the sales of all products to Amazon, while also paying
for advertising space with Amazon); Kim, supra note 14 (noting that sellers on
Amazon pay for advertising space and lose consumer opportunities to Amazon).
184. See European Commission Press Release IP/18/6346, supra note 68 (noting
that Disney created unfair competition to consumers and third-party streaming
platforms by limiting the access of EU Member State consumers in and out of the
UK).
185. See id. (noting that EU consumers in the UK were offered different services
and streaming channels than EU consumers streaming outside of UK, which is not
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transactions across the EU and not limited or restricted.186 Therefore,
Disney created dissimilar conditions for the consumer by regulating
the streaming service by location, giving Disney an unfair advantage
over third-party networks as well.187 Disney contractually created a
difference in its streaming platform and limited the options of the
consumer.188 Amazon, similarly to Disney, restricted competition
across the EU by enforcing agreements granting Amazon access to
proprietary data collection used to replicate best-selling products,
causing a chilling effect on independent third-party sellers.189 Amazon
restricted competition and limited consumer choice by forcing
individual and third-party sellers out of the market.190 Amazon created
dissimilar conditions for the seller and consumer in what should be an
equal transaction between Amazon and the seller.191
Amazon is a different platform than Disney and the phone service
providers because Amazon created its own market.192 Amazon serves
to simplify the consumer transaction, which is why Amazon offers
such a wide array of products.193 Given that Amazon is an online
to be confused with citizenship; rather, it is about EU Member State citizens who
are all consumers under the Single Market).
186. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (prohibiting all agreements between
undertakings which create unfair conditions between consumers based on their
region and streamers who cannot access all consumers).
187. See European Commission Press Release IP/18/6346, supra note 68
(demonstrating that Disney forced third-party streaming services out of additional
users by restricting the broadcasting of the third-party networks to geographic
locations).
188. See id. (limiting the options of the consumer is inconsistent with competition
practices in the Single Market in the EU; there was no benefit from the limitation);
see also TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101.
189. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (evidencing that third-party sellers have begun
taking retail offers to other places out of fear of being replicated by Amazon, and
others have stopped creating for the marketplace, or lost a business altogether).
190. See Dudley, supra note 14 (noting that some sellers complained about the
loss of profits being so significant that it could eventually lead to the demise of their
business, an experience some smaller sellers have already had).
191. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (providing that dissimilar conditions occur
when a party makes an otherwise equal transaction unequal).
192. Hall, supra note 108 (Amazon started as an online bookstore, then developed
into an online marketplace where sellers of almost anything can use the
marketplace); see also Mattioli, supra note 10 (evidencing that Amazon owns the
marketplace and controls what goes on the market).
193. Hall, supra note 108 (being an online bookstore was only the beginning for

594

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

platform that simplifies consumer transactions, Amazon could claim
an Article 101(3) exception.194 Article 101(3) creates an exception to
Article 101(1) violations if the violation brings technological and
economic advances and does not hurt consumer choice.195 Under
Article 101(3), Amazon, as an online platform, may present economic
advancement, and perhaps a technological advancement, as a greater
benefit than harm to the market.196 Furthermore, Amazon could claim
that replicating products does not hinder consumer choice, but rather
encourages choice because the consumer is presented with additional
options in the market.197
However, regardless of any economic advances made by Amazon,
such advances are losses for sellers on the marketplace.198 Moreover,
the technological advances are small in comparison to the distortion
of the market.199 When considering an Article 101(3) exception, the
the ambitious platform, which later entered the web services and cloud storage
sectors); see also Mattioli, supra note 10 (noting that Amazon wants to make up ten
percent of the retail sales on the marketplace platform by 2022; this reflects the rapid
growth Amazon desires and has been able to carry out).
194. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (providing that Article 101(3) carves out
an exception to Article 101(1), but it is narrow and only for significant breakthroughs
in the economy and for the enhancement of technology); see generally TFEU, supra
note 8 (implementation of the Articles is provided for in the TFEU).
195. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101; see also Parenti, supra note 6 (evidencing that
consumer choice is important in the Single Market since consumers must have the
ability to choose between different products on the market; high quality, top items
are one option, while other generic, more affordable products are another).
196. See Hall, supra note 108 (demonstrating that as an online marketplace with
its own private label, various tech devices, and cloud and web services, Amazon has
created tech advancements offered at low prices, supporting a claim of economic
advancement).
197. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (noting that Amazon has over 243,000 products
on the marketplace, not including what Amazon offers outside of the traditional
online marketplace, giving the consumer endless options).
198. See Kim, supra note 14 (noting that sellers are nervous about the loss of sales
to Amazon because Amazon advertises as a cheaper, comparable alternative); see
also Dudley, supra note 14 (providing that sellers repeatedly expressed frustration
about paying for advertising, only to learn that Amazon reserved the top slot for its
own products); Mattioli, supra note 10 (noting that product developers opted to go
with Walmart instead of Amazon out of fear of product replication).
199. See Let’s Talk Numbers, supra note 132 (noting that sellers pay several costs
and fees to sell on the marketplace and the margins for independent sellers are
significant compared to Amazon, who provides a marketplace and now additionally
profits from private-label production).
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benefits must be greater than the cost.200 Amazon costs a great deal to
sellers on the platform and gains a significant advantage within its own
market.201 Amazon also costs consumers because when small
businesses can no longer compete, Amazon becomes the only
option.202 Additionally, a typical customer will opt for the cheaper
item, often causing a decrease in overall quality. 203 Even if Amazon
had enough benefits to raise a claim to Article 101(3), the harms under
Article 101(1) are too significant.204

B. AMAZON IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 102(C)
Article 102 addresses abuse by an entity engaged in undertakings
from a dominant position within the internal market.205 Article 102
prohibits abuse of dominance in the market.206 Article 102(c)
specifically prohibits abuse by dominant entities where dissimilar
conditions are applied to equivalent transactions, placing the smaller
200. See Parenti, supra note 6 (suggesting that Article 101(3) specifies the
advancements that are needed and since anticompetitive agreements are highly
scrutinized, the burden lies with Amazon to prove the advancements outweigh the
costs); see also TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101.
201. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (demonstrating that in order to have sales,
Amazon must take away sales from independent makers); see also Dudley, supra
note 14 (noting that sellers are unable to advertise in the highest slot because it is
reserved for Amazon, and consumers see Amazon’s product as the first in the
listing); Kim, supra note 14 (noting that sellers are facing direct competition from
the place that they market, drawing away sales and making it hard to compete).
202. See Dudley, supra note 14 (evidencing that Amazon will force other sellers
off the market, leaving no other choice than Amazon, and since it is the more
affordable option, it effectively becomes the only option; consumers are hurt by the
limited quality options).
203. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (evidencing that Amazon, by making a cheaper
product, affects the quality and care of small businesses who develop the product);
see also Dudley, supra note 14 (suggesting that not allowing others to advertise in
the top slot is a hindrance to competition, but also causes potentially higher quality
products to be demoted because they are never featured).
204. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101 (demonstrating how under Article 101(1),
Amazon created a system that is too harmful because sellers cannot fairly compete
with Amazon).
205. TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102 (providing that Article 102 prohibits dissimilar
conditions as well as abuse of an advantageous position in the market.
206. See Parenti, supra note 6 ( Dominant positions are assessed in relation to the
internal market as a whole. . . . How much of the market . . . will depend on the
nature of the product, availability of alternative products, and consumers’ behaviour
and readiness to switch to alternative products. ).
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entities at a competitive disadvantage.207
Amazon, by requiring proprietary data collection from independent
sellers in order to use its marketplace, abuses its dominance by using
the data to gain a competitive advantage over independent sellers. 208
Again, charging independent sellers to advertise on the platform while
simultaneously replicating their products is an abuse of the market.209
Amazon is an undertaking because it is an online platform engaged
in economic activity in the EU.210 Controlling roughly forty percent of
the retail market qualifies Amazon as a substantial part of the
market.211 Amazon’s engaging as a seller in the marketplace also
constitutes an economic activity within the EU.212 Amazon earned
over thirty-two billion Euros in 2019, so at the very least, Amazon is
involved with economic activity in the EU.213 Amazon unquestionably
impacts trade between Member States and under its current practices
is inconsistent with Article 102(c).214
Abuse in a dominant position means applying dissimilar conditions
207. See id. (providing that dissimilar conditions are any restrictions, concerted
practices, or agreements that give one party an unfair advantage over the other).
208. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (noting that Amazon argues the data is not used
improperly, but former and current executives argue it is regular practice to use data
to replicate products).
209. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 101; see also Mattioli, supra note 10
(demonstrating how Amazon not only charges sellers for access to the platform but
then takes away sales by producing private-label replicas).
210. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13
(“ . . . Article 102 outlaws abuses by dominant companies.”).
211. See Tugba Sabanoglu, Third-Party Seller Share of Amazon Platform 20072020,
AMAZON
VIA
STATISTA
(Feb.
11,
2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/259782/third-party-seller-share-of-amazonplatform/ (showing that in the first quarter of 2020, 52 percent of paid units on
Amazon’s marketplace were by third-party sellers; units sold on the platform are not
exclusive to small businesses).
212. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 38, at 13
(selling goods in an online marketplace, is economic activity, which is an
undertaking, and therefore Amazon is engaged in economic activity in the EU).
213. Coppola, supra note 158 (demonstrating Amazon’s total revenue from the
EU, alluding that the company has a dominant position in the Single Market); see
also Sabanoglu, supra note 211.
214. See Westerhoff, supra note 156 (demonstrating that Amazon has a significant
position in the Single Market in the EU); see also TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102
(evidencing that Amazon abuses its position in the market whenever it creates
dissimilar conditions between undertakings).
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to equivalent transactions with other trading parties.215 If Amazon did
not collect proprietary data, the competition would be fairer, but this
data allows Amazon to see the good and bad qualities of products
before creating their replicas.216 Additionally, Amazon has access to
ideal price points, costs of labor, and materials while the unsuspecting
independent seller is still paying to advertise and sell on Amazon.217
Amazon can make a better, more affordable product more cheaply
than the independent sellers whose data Amazon collects and uses to
replicate the product; this practice is highly unfair and deviates from
the practices of traditional brick and mortar entities.218 Amazon
developed the marketplace and, through private-label products,
situates itself for complete control of the market in a manner
inconsistent with Article 102(c).219
Google has repeatedly created dissimilar conditions from a position
of dominance in the market violating Article 102.220 For instance,
Google bumps competitor listings down to bolster its own products.221
Google, after creating Froogle, bumped competitor shopping networks
down the list in favor of its own network.222 Additionally, when
215. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102 (dissimilar conditions occur when one
undertaking gains an unfair competitive advantage in the market by way of
agreement, arrangement, or some alternative construction); see also Parenti, supra
note 6.
216. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (noting that it is a regular business practice to
compare best-selling products to a model Amazon creates; Amazon searches the
customer reviews and obtains other feedback about the product before going forward
on production).
217. See id. (Amazon is replicating products to increase its own value in the
market); see also Dudley, supra note 14 (noting that Amazon intentionally solicits
consumers away from sellers and continues to charge for advertising and other
associated fees).
218. See Mattioli, supra note 10; see also Dudley, supra note 14 (demonstrating
that Amazon collects data on its competition that normal brick and mortar entities
cannot gather, thus creating a new marketplace with no regulation).
219. See TFEU, supra note 8, art. 102 (providing that Article 102 explicitly deals
with abusing a dominant position in the Single Market, creating dissimilar
conditions between undertakings);
220. See Condliffe, supra note 18 (noting that Google has been fined over two
separate times for abusing dominance in the market: promoting its own shopping
network over others and favoring its own search engine over others).
221. See id. (noting as well that the continued fines have not stopped Google from
engaging in anticompetitive practices within the Single Market).
222. Id. (discussing how Google bumped down competitor listings in hopes of
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contracting with third parties and manufacturers, Google required
exclusive engagement with Google applications prior to allowing
service providers the license to Android software and Android forks,
which are non-Google Android programs.223 This runs parallel to
Amazon’s practice of requiring data collection prior to access to the
platform.224 Additionally, Google’s practice of promoting its shopping
network while simultaneously demoting its competitors matches the
behavior of Amazon using its own platform to promote its privatelabel products over the products of third-party sellers.225
In 2004, the EU accused Microsoft of abusing its dominance in the
market and, after Microsoft failed to comply with a settlement
agreement, fined Microsoft and demanded that the Windows operating
system be remedied to be consistent with the terms of the settlement
agreement.226 Microsoft, like Amazon, favored its own products in the
market, so much so that competitors could not even challenge the
Windows operating system.227 Amazon sellers, like Microsoft
competitors, cannot compete in a rigged system and eventually die out
without legal remedy.228
In 2009, the EU faced abuse in the market by Intel. For roughly five
years, Intel created a computer chip rebate program that offered
generating more favorable outcomes for itself).
223. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, supra note 84 (noting that
service providers could not get permission to sell alternative versions of Android
without approval, but approval was based solely on downloading Google
applications).
224. See Westerhoff, supra note 156; see also Dudley, supra note 14
(demonstrating how Amazon bumps listings like Google by reserving the top slot
for itself); Kim, supra note 14 (noting that Amazon bumps competitor listings by
offering its own products on competitors’ listings).
225. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (showing how Amazon only varies slightly when
compared to Google, but not enough to create a different outcome; Amazon sellers
are hindered the same way Google’s competitors were).
226. Castle & Jolly, supra note 98 (noting how Microsoft violated Article 102
twice by not allowing other operating systems a chance to compete with the
Windows operating system, and even though Microsoft settled, it did not comply
with the terms); Condliffe, supra note 18.
227. Castle & Jolly, supra note 98 (noting that Microsoft was forced to change
the operating system to be fairer to competitors who could not get their programs to
work within the Windows system).
228. See id. (evidencing that it took years and multiple punitive fines by the
Commission to finally get Microsoft to follow the terms of the 2004 judgment).
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significant discounts for purchasing exclusively with Intel. From the
success of the rebates, Intel controlled seventy percent of the computer
chip market.229 Amazon, like Intel, creates discounted versions of the
independent sellers’ products, and with an Amazon Prime
membership, entices the consumer further with free, two-day shipping
and other services that small companies and individuals cannot
provide.230
In 2017, Facebook abused its place in the internal market by
combining Facebook user data with data from WhatsApp.231 Facebook
previously testified to the Commission that Facebook would not
merge the data between the two applications, but did so later.232
Facebook, making its money in adverts, abused its position of
dominance to gain an advertising advantage over other social media
and advertising-based platforms.233 Amazon, a company with
significant interest in advertising, has limited the advertising ability of
its sellers and collected proprietary data, giving itself a significant
advantage by exploiting user data.234 As a consequence of violating
Article 102, each company in the above-mentioned cases was forced
to pay a fine, cease the abusive practice, or both.235

229. Condliffe, supra note 18 (Intel controlled seventy percent of the market by
offering rebates to returning customers who refused to shop anywhere else,
preventing other chip makers from engaging in the market).
230. Amazon Stores Around the World, supra note 120 (Amazon’s fulfillment
service certifies items under Prime, but, after production replication, Amazon offers
Prime on its item undercutting the seller).
231. Condliffe, supra note 18 (noting that Facebook merged the data of users
between the two apps after the acquisition, despite testifying that it intended to do
the very opposite, giving itself an advertising advantage).
232. Id. (noting that Facebook merged the data after explicitly stating on the
record it had no intention to do so and subsequently received a fine for the
malfeasance).
233. Id. (noting that after purchasing Whatsapp, Facebook merged that data
between the two, creating an advertising advantage between the platforms for
Facebook; prior to the merge, Facebook made its money by advertising and leasing
advertising space on the platform to target users).
234. See Dudley, supra note 14 (noting that Amazon previously sold all
advertising slots, including the coveted top left slot, but now competitors can only
advertise in slots not reserved for Amazon).
235. See Condliffe, supra note 18 (noting that Microsoft, Intel, and Facebook
received fines for abusive practices and must stop the anticompetitive practice).
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RECOMMENDATIONS

A. RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR THE EUROPEAN
COMPETITION NETWORK
The European Competition Network (ECN) is a specialized unit
within the EU that has the authority to investigate and address
anticompetitive practices in the EU.236 The ECN is made up of the
National Competition Authority (NCA) within the Member States of
the EU.237 The NCA can conduct its own investigations, but the ECN
can relieve the NCA of its investigation if the ECN takes over.238 The
ECN should send official correspondence to the EU members
detailing action to be taken against Amazon.239 First, the EU should
collectively sue Amazon with a binding agreement that no member
state will settle prior to the outcome of the lawsuit.240 Germany
formally inquired about Amazon’s business practices but settled prior
to obtaining any legally binding substantive goals for the EU.241 The
EU is a large central governing body made up of several member
states, each of which could settle prior to the conclusion of the suit
236. Eur. Comm’n, Competition: European Competition Network, EUROPA
(2020), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html (“The European
Commission and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States
cooperate through the European Competition Network (ECN).”).
237. Eur. Comm’n, Competition Antitrust Overview, supra note 6 (“National
Competition Authorities (NCAs) are empowered to apply Articles 101 and 102 of
the Treaty fully, to ensure that competition is not distorted or restricted.”).
238. See Eur. Comm’n, Competition: European Competition Network, supra note
236 (“Through the ECN, the competition authorities inform each other of proposed
decisions and take on board comments from the other competition authorities.”).
239. See id. (suggesting that Amazon has violated the TFEU across multiple
borders and it is proper for the ECN to confront the anticompetitive practices).
240. See CNBC Tech, Amazon in deal with German watchdog to overhaul
marketplace
terms,
CNBC
(July
17,
2019)
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/amazon-in-deal-with-german-watchdog-tooverhaul-marketplace-terms.html (noting that Germany settled after Amazon made
promises to change contractual arrangements with third-party sellers; however, the
concessions are not legally binding, nor do they prevent proprietary data collection
and Interbrand competition).
241. Id.; see also Westerhoff, supra note 156 (“Amazon did not commit to
anything hindering its ability to engage in interbrand competition. . . . However, as
noted above, the FCO’s case may be more hype than substance, with rather limited
effects, raising new problems in terms of lack of guidance and deterrence effect.”).
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which would fail to hold Amazon to account.242
The Legislative Council of the EU should propose new legislation
that specifically regulates expanding online marketplaces and
proprietary data collection.243 Third-party proprietary data collection
is unnecessary and violates the privacy of independent sellers and
creators.244 The legislation would be akin to the legislation created by
the Council to regulate individual personal data collection.245 If the
legislation is as exhaustive as the regulation regarding personal data
collection, then it will further limit unfair contracting practices
between sellers and Amazon.246 First, the regulation will prohibit
contractual arrangements that involve an exchange of proprietary data
for access to the dominant marketplaces.247 Second, if the collection is
necessary, (consistent with the exception outlined in Article 101(3) of
the TFEU) then the data collected must be on a secure cloud drive that
is inaccessible to employees outside of evaluation departments, and all
employees must be contractually bound to keep the data
confidential.248 Third, in the interest of protecting the principles of
competition, a producer of a marketplace should be prohibited from
creating private-label versions of existing products on that market.249
242. See Gabel, supra note 20 (stating that each Member State has its own
government system and NCA board, therefore collective action prevents individual
settlement).
243. See Eur. Comm’n, Data Protection in the EU, EUROPA (2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en
( Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. ).
244. See id. (noting that personal data is fundamentally protected, and business
secrets should be extended similar protection, as this will secure competition in the
market).
245. See id. (evidencing that the individual person in the EU is protected under
specific data laws and rights which should be extended to protect small sellers).
246. See id. (providing that the legislation itself provides for several different
occurrences of data collection; it is practical to introduce legislation consistent with
protecting small business owners).
247. TFEU, supra note 8, arts. 101 02 (demonstrating that prohibiting
anticompetitive agreements is a good starting point, but it is reactive rather than
proactive).
248. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (suggesting that access to proprietary data was
supposed to be limited in use by Amazon executives, consequently additional
measures must ensure going forward that data remains confidential).
249. See id. (demonstrating that Amazon’s business model creating the market
then creating private-label products does not foster legitimate competition;
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Additionally, a complaint system should be established through the
ECN for anyone who believes their proprietary data was used
unfairly.250 The system should have a built-in, monitoring structure for
periodic review, approximately every five years, of the actions of
those found to have violated the anti-competition laws previously as a
self-check to prevent further abuse.251

B. THE EU SHOULD COLLECTIVELY SUE AMAZON IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The TFEU, by way of Protocol No. 27, can gather the Member
States and file a lawsuit against Amazon for violating Articles
101(1)(d) and 102(c) of the TFEU.252 The European Court of Justice
is the highest arbiter of lawsuits in the EU.253 The European Court of
Justice would oversee the proceedings and make the proper
determination of damages for Amazon’s anticompetitive behaviors.254
Additionally, the Court could give other remedies consistent with a
comprehensive ban on private-label replication.255

instead, it creates more revenue for Amazon while eliminating third-party, small
competitors).
250. See European Parliament Commission on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, at 19–23, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19 (June
2012) (demonstrating how all comments must go through the official ECN or the
NCA of the respective Member State; however, instead of going through the
Member State, the ECN or NCA should have an EU system outside of the Member
States).
251. See Castle & Jolly, supra note 98; see also Condliffe, supra note 18
(demonstrating that Microsoft is not an outlier; many companies tend to be repeat
offenders, so having regular checks could serve as a better deterrent for repeat
offenders and larger dominant entities).
252. See TFEU, supra note 8, Protocol No. 27.
253. See Udo Bux, Fact Sheets on the European Union: The Court of Justice of
the European Union, EUROPA (2020) www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en (“The
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interprets EU law to make sure it is
applied in the same way in all EU countries, and settles legal disputes between
national governments and EU institutions.”).
254. See id. (stating that the Court’s job is to interpret EU law, and therefore the
decisions regarding Amazon should be interpreted by the Court to set the proper
remedy and precedent).
255. See Westerhoff, supra note 156 (noting how Germany did not secure legal
obligations from Amazon; therefore, the Court can issue a judgment against Amazon
with recurring penalties should Amazon fail to comply).
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C. THE EU SHOULD CREATE A GRANT PROGRAM FOR
INDEPENDENT SELLERS AND ONLINE MARKETPLACES
Derived from the judgment for Amazon’s violation of the TFEU,
the EU should develop a grant program awarding small online
marketplaces supplementary support to compete in the internal
market.256 Product development, including marketing, is a significant
part of the appeal of a platform like Amazon.257 If grants were issued
to level the playing field, then other online platforms could be
available and offer the marketing opportunity and customer base to
compete with Amazon’s marketplace.258
The grants will ensure Amazon faces competition in the EU market
to prevent Amazon from creating a market and then controlling it.259
If Amazon faces competition over attracting independent sellers, then
Amazon will feel encouraged, at the very least, to follow the
provisions of the TFEU.260 With multiples factories in several member
states of the EU, Amazon has grown to be a major retailer in the EU.261
Additional grant awards would be issued to creative new mediums
which simplify the consumer transaction while providing the
consumer with quality options and affordability.262
256. See European Parliament Commission on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra note 250, at 38–42 (noting that legal
redress is challenging and the infrequent payouts do not result in creating
competition; rather, they remedy an inability to compete).
257. See Dudley, supra note 14 (noting that sellers regularly purchased the top
slot for advertising on the platform); see also Amazon Stores Around the World,
supra note 120 (demonstrating why sellers desired access to the world’s largest
retailer).
258. See Mattioli, supra note 10 (showing that Amazon does not face significant
competition for an online seller platform; while some go to other major retailers like
Walmart, there are no platforms to compete with Amazon).
259. See id. (noting that despite humble beginnings, Amazon has grown with over
243,000 private-label products, and Amazon has created a market and is trying to
control the sales on the market, too).
260. See id. (evidencing that Amazon expressed worry over growing antitrust
concerns and whether the industry, including Amazon, should be regulated).
261. See Madrigal, supra note 116 (noting that Amazon is the owner of the largest
retail facility in the world and that this has only expanded Amazon’s retail sales and
private-label creation); see also Amazon Stores Around the World, supra note 121.
262. See Madrigal, supra note 116 (Amazon offers a simplified consumer
experience with several advancements for the consumer, but at a significant cost, so,
consequences will incentivize Amazon to comply with the rules).
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V. CONCLUSION
Amazon is in violation of EU competition law by requiring
proprietary data collection from sellers for access to its massive global
platform. Amazon uses this collected data to directly compete with
independent sellers by replicating the best-selling products and
directly advertising them under the private-label products. Amazon
offers these private-label products as a more affordable alternative,
placing unfair and dissimilar conditions on equal transactions. It is an
abuse of power for one of the largest global online retailers to create a
market, force sellers to hand over data in order to replicate certain
products, and resell them cheaply . Amazon is engaging in
anticompetitive behavior, inconsistent with the TFEU, specifically in
violation of Articles 101(1)(d) and 102(c). Thus, the EU should
collectively sue Amazon and ban private-label product replication in
the EU to protect competition in the internal market.

